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The Whistles of George Wallace:
Gender and Emotions in the 1968
Presidential Campaign
Maarten Zwiers
1 Few  had  foreseen  it:  Donald  Trump’s  victory  in  the  2016  presidential  election.  The
Republican establishment shuddered during the primaries, but then quickly fell in line
behind its new leader. The rise to power of Trump – or more specifically, his political
style – had been long in the making, despite the disbelief that gripped the country after
Election  Day.  Since  the  1960s,  the  GOP  crafted  a  political  message  catering  to  the
conservative white vote set loose by the civil rights revolution. This message was partly
based on the idea of  middle-class  respectability.  But beneath the thin veneer of  this
suburban American Dream, a much darker vision lurked: a hyper-masculine and racist
vision finally exposed by the presidency of Donald Trump. His rhetoric about immigrants
(“bad hombres”  and “rapists”),  women (“grab them by the pussy”),  and Washington
politics  (“drain  the  swamp”)  harken  back  to  the  ambitions  of  George  Wallace,  the
segregationist governor of Alabama who ran for the presidency in 1968.1 Republicans
appropriated, fine-tuned, and whitewashed his message in the following decades, hoping
that people would eventually forget one of their main sources of inspiration. But with
Donald  Trump in  the  White  House, it  is  hard to  deny how a  Wallaceite  agenda has
increasingly determined the course of the Republican Party.
2 George  Wallace’s  impact  on  Republican  politics  has  been  a  topic  of  debate  amongst
historians. Wallace’s foremost biographer, Dan Carter, connects the Alabama governor’s
race baiting with the racialized program of the GOP. Republicans started accommodating
segregationist white southerners once their old party, the Democrats, gave in to demands
of  the civil  rights  movement.  Carter  made this  argument  most  explicitly  in his  slim
volume From George Wallace to Newt Gingrich,  in which he draws a direct line between
Wallace’s “politics of anger” and the Republican agenda of Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan,
and Newt Gingrich, the Republican Speaker of the House between 1995 and 1999.2 A group
of younger scholars challenged Carter’s race-based approach, pointing out the similarities
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between racial sentiments in the North and South and thus deconstructing the idea of
southern  exceptionalism.  Their  thesis  rests  on  the  fact  that  postwar  economic
development  led  to  increased  suburbanization  in  the  South.  Attitudes  in  southern
suburbia turned out to be not that different from suburbs in the North and West; its
inhabitants all shared a kindred class ideology. In his book The Silent Majority, historian
Matthew Lassiter explained how a racially charged “Southern Strategy” was disastrous
for  southern Republicans  running in  the  1970  midterm elections.3 Political  scientists
Byron Shafer and Richard Johnston made a similar argument in their book The End of
Southern  Exceptionalism.  They  concluded  that  “the  engine  of  partisan  change  in  the
postwar South was, first and foremost, economic development and an associated politics
of social class.”4 Economic diversification and the emergence of a southern middle class
explain Republican success in the region, and suburban values in the South did not differ
much from suburban values in the North.
3 A factor that is often overlooked in efforts to explain partisan change in the South (and
the development of modern conservatism in the United States more broadly) is gender,
especially a gendered political style that plays on voters’ emotions. In The Rise of Southern
Republicans,  political  scientists  Earl  Black  and  Merle  Black  devote  some  attention  to
gender, pointing out how a majority of southern white men (57 percent) and a plurality of
southern  white  women  (49  percent)  can  be  considered  core  Republicans.  They  also
concluded  that  besides  race,  gender  and  religion  in  fact  trumped economic  class  in
separating core Republicans from core Democrats in the post-Jim Crow South.5 Black and
Black examined voting patterns, however, and did not pay much attention to the political
style that attracted these voters. Other scholars have studied grassroots organizations led
by  women,  for  instance  groups  that  fought  school  integration  or  supported  Barry
Goldwater’s 1964 presidential campaign.6 Kari Frederickson demonstrated how familial
metaphors (in particular an “explosive language of sex and domesticity”) functioned in
the Dixiecrat campaign of 1948.7 Historian Steve Estes takes a comparable approach in his
examination  of  Citizens’  Council  rhetoric,  a  discourse  influenced  by  masculine  ideas
about honor, violence, and social control.8 Analyses that foreground gender as a crucial
cultural factor in segregationist opposition, partisan change, and the general appeal of
conservative populism remain rather sparse however, despite their strong explanatory
power.  “Historians  are  familiar  with  the  political  narrative  of  the  modern  South,”
Frederickson  noted,  “but  few  have  examined  the  cultural  dimensions  of  political
resistance and change during this tumultuous period.”9
4 This article incorporates gender as an analytical  tool to examine the development of
modern  conservatism  in  the  United  States  from  an  intersectional  perspective.10 It
suggests to move beyond the race/class binary and include gender (and sexuality) to
understand the interlocking mechanisms that gave rise to a new style of conservative
politics.  Although intersectionality originated as  a  paradigm to study interdependent
systems of oppression and discrimination especially women of color encounter,  some
scholars  have  recently  proposed  to  extend  its  theoretical  boundaries.  “Framing
intersectionality  as  only  about  women  of  color  gives  masculinity,  whiteness,  and
maleness an intersectional pass,” legal scholar Devon Carbado argued.11 The following
text builds on Carbado’s insights and offers an intersectional analysis of a demographic
that was heavily invested in the dominant power structures of U.S. society: the voters
who supported George Wallace and Richard Nixon in the 1968 election. These voters felt
threatened in their race, class, and gender status by groups who became more vocal in
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their  opposition to the heteropatriarchal  system during the 1960s.  A strong sense of
white victimhood provided fertile ground for a recalibration of American conservatism.
5 The 1968 presidential campaign thus constituted a pivotal moment in the rise of a more
authoritarian form of conservative politics. George Wallace and Richard Nixon ripped the
New Deal coalition of the Democratic Party apart that year, with a masculine message of
law and order at home and peace with honor in Southeast Asia. It was a message that
combined race and class issues in a gendered discourse that defended traditionalism and
white privilege. Such language evoked an emotional response from working- and middle-
class whites (the so-called Silent Majority) who longed for a restoration of an orderly
society based on “family values” and a return to power for the United States on the world
stage.12 Feelings of victimization and emasculation resulted in a yearning for “tough”
leaders who would crack down on civil rights radicals, unruly student protesters, feminist
activists,  and North-Vietnamese guerrillas.  As  the establishment  candidate,  Democrat
Hubert  Humphrey  had  trouble  convincing  voters  he  could  play  such  a  role.  As  an
outsider, Wallace was in an ideal position to attack Washington politics represented by
Humphrey. Nixon had been out of the political limelight for almost six years, after his
disastrous  campaign  for  the  governorship  of  California  in  1962.  In  1968,  people
remembered  him  as  the  hard-boiled  communist  hunter  on  the  House  Un-American
Activities Committee (HUAC) and as Dwight Eisenhower’s vice-president. For the Silent
Majority, the suburban American Dream reached its peak during the Eisenhower years.
Nixon but especially Wallace practiced a political style that fed on feelings of anger, fear,
and anxiety. This style was extremely powerful in attracting voters who felt they were
losing control over their lives and over the destiny of their country.13
6 Historians  have  become  increasingly  interested  in  the  role  of  emotions  in  politics,
specifically how they relate to gender.14 At the same time, political scientists have begun
to pay more attention to populism, studying it for instance as a thin-centered ideology
dividing “the pure people” from a “corrupt elite” or as a specific political style.15 This
article  combines  insights  from  gender  studies,  political  science,  and  the  history  of
emotions to explain George Wallace’s appeal in the 1968 presidential election. Wallace’s
populist  campaign  set  the  stage  for  an  emotional  style  of  conservative  politics  that
remains effective until this day. A focus on gender and emotions may not only offer an
intersectional  synthesis  between  the  race-  and  class-based  approaches  that  have
dominated  historiography,  but  it  also  gives  an  explanation  for  the  failure  of  liberal
politicians to find an effective response to populist conservatism – a style drenched in
toxic masculinity that is now a prominent feature of political cultures across the globe.16
George Wallace was one of its most important historical  agents in the United States.
During the 1960s he channeled it to the national level, where it was subsequently picked
up by elements within the conservative movement. As such, the whistles of Wallace can
still  be  heard  in  contemporary  U.S.  politics  –  a  powerful  weapon  in  the  hands  of
reactionary demagogues and a formidable barrier to progressive change. 
 
1. Whistling Dixie: White Victimization and the
Southern Heartland
7 George  Wallace’s  first  real  claim  to  national  fame  came  in  June  1963,  when  he
orchestrated his  Stand in the Schoolhouse Door at  the University of  Alabama.  A few
months before, in his inaugural address as governor, he had promised the white people of
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his state that segregation would last forever. When a federal district court ordered the
flagship school of Alabama to desegregate that summer, Wallace traveled to Tuscaloosa to
prevent the registration of two black students, Vivian Malone and James Hood. It was a
quixotic effort from the start; the Department of Justice had dispatched Deputy Attorney
General  Nicholas  Katzenbach  and  a  contingent  of  federal  marshals  to  oversee  the
admission process.  When President Kennedy federalized the Alabama National Guard,
Wallace finally had to give up his delaying action. Although the governor was forced to
withdraw, he emerged victorious from this confrontation with federal power. In the first
place, he had kept his promise to the Alabama people he would fight for segregation, even
against  great  odds.  Secondly,  the  stand  gave  him  the  opportunity  to  reframe  his
segregationist message into an all-American defense of constitutional values. According
to Wallace, the presence of federal officers on the campus of the University of Alabama
offered a
frightful example of the oppression of the rights, privileges and sovereignty of this
State  by  officers  of  the  Federal  Government.  This  intrusion  results  solely  from
force, or threat of force, undignified by any reasonable application of the principle
of law, reason and justice.17 
8 Such rhetoric struck a chord outside the Jim Crow South. In contrast with the outright
segregationist  content of  his inaugural  address,  Wallace’s speech at the University of
Alabama almost sounded dignified, although the underlying objectives of his actions were
pretty clear: the denial of black students to enroll in the school. In the week following the
Stand in the Schoolhouse Door, Wallace received more than 100,000 telegrams and letters
congratulating  the  governor  for  his  vindication  (or  interpretation)  of  constitutional
principles. Wallace’s attempt to stop Katzenbach and his marshals had been broadcast on
national  television,  widening  the  range  of  his  message.  Over  fifty  percent  of  the
correspondence he received after his stand came from outside the region and 95 percent
of  it  was positive about the governor’s  performance in Tuscaloosa.  Wallace began to
realize the appeal of his words outside the South. “They all hate black people, all of them.
They’re all afraid, all of them,” he discovered. “Great God! That’s it! They’re all Southern!
The whole United States is Southern!”18 These feelings of hate and fear would be central
to the national campaigns George Wallace began to wage after 1963. 
9 Wallace’s forays into the North began in earnest in 1964, when he participated in a few
presidential primaries of the Democratic Party. He did surprisingly well in Wisconsin and
Indiana, where he capitalized on the growing unrest among blue-collar and middle-class
whites  disturbed  by  the  civil  rights  revolution.  “Clearly  the  phenomenon  of  George
Wallace was a force to reckon with in an era of sometimes violent social change,” said
Indiana Governor Matthew Welsh, who campaigned against Wallace as a substitute for
Lyndon Johnson. “In the Milwaukee suburbs and the Calumet steel towns, where white
Americans  felt  threatened  by  blacks,  there  was  voter  reprisal.”19 Wallace  did  not
campaign on an openly racist platform. He instead touted a small government program
opposed to  federal  interference  in  state  and local  matters  –  the  same ideas  he  had
articulated when he tried to prevent the racial integration of the University of Alabama a
year  earlier.  The  pending  Civil  Rights  Act  served as  his  main  target.  But  instead of
denouncing  its  anti-segregationist  nature,  Wallace  preferred  to  describe  it  as  a  step
towards totalitarianism engineered by Washington bureaucrats hungry for power.  He
used southern humor to parry uncomfortable questions at rallies. His audiences greeted
such responses  with applause  and laughter.20 Wallace’s  states’  rights  agenda and his
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political style created “emotional turmoil” in a state that was far removed from the civil
rights battles then happening in the Deep South.21 
10 The Welsh campaign encountered similar problems Hubert Humphrey had to deal with in
1968,  when Nixon and Wallace  confronted him with  challenges  from the  right.  Like
Humphrey, Welsh ran as the establishment candidate. He introduced a significant tax
increase during his administration (which did not enhance his popularity) and he was
also an outspoken civil rights supporter. Welsh rightly feared Wallace would easily win
the state Democratic primary without significant opposition, which was the reason why
he  entered  the  race.  The  Indiana  governor  made  sure  to  inform voters  he  was  not
campaigning for personal glory, however. His slogan was “Clear The Way for LBJ. Vote for
Welsh the 5th of May,” indicating he was supportive of continuity in federal politics. In
order to defeat Wallace, Welsh mobilized the Democratic Party machine in Indiana and
consulted with members of its congressional delegation. The governor feared a successful
Wallace  campaign  “would  revive  and  give  credence  to  a  racist  philosophy  my
administration had worked very hard to defuse.”22 With Wallace barnstorming through
the state, it would be hard to suppress “the latent bigotry held in check by the new social
pressure for equality among all people.” For Welsh, the reputation of Indiana (and the
embarrassment a Wallace victory would cause) seemed to be foremost on his mind.23
Wallace threatened to crack the veneer of precarious racial progress that covered a long
history of structural racism in the North.
11 George Wallace’s strong showing in Wisconsin, Indiana, and the border state of Maryland
indicated the appeal of his politics outside the Jim Crow South. How can this popularity
be explained? Wallace expressed the anxiety and anger many white Americans felt about
civil rights concessions by the federal government, especially how it threatened their
white  privilege.  Such  emotions  were  not  limited  to  working-class  whites; political
scientist Michael Rogin discovered how “anti-Negro feeling is even more salient in the
urban middle  class.”  Suburbanites  in  Wisconsin  had “sought  to  create  homogeneous
communities; the potential presence of Negroes terrifies them, as they perceive a threat
both to property values and life styles.”24 The Civil Rights Act (then under discussion in
the U.S. Senate) not only destroyed the legal basis for segregation in the South, but also
opened the door for challenges to white privilege in the North.  For many years,  the
federal government had been actively involved in making the suburban American Dream
a reality for middle- and upper-class whites by subsidizing the development of suburbs
and  highways  and  providing  them with  low-interest  mortgages  through the  Federal
Housing Administration (FHA). The results of these policies were twofold: despite massive
government  assistance,  whites  thought  they  had  achieved  their  place  in  suburban
America on the basis of hard work alone, a false sense of meritocracy. Secondly, once the
federal  government  attempted  to  alter  some  of  its  racialized  policies  (for  instance
through the Civil  Rights Act  and later the Fair  Housing Act),  white suburbanites felt
victimized by the Washington bureaucracy without realizing how it had helped them
achieve their privileged position.25 
12 As a deus ex machina, George Wallace appeared on the national scene in the early sixties to
give an unadulterated voice to feelings of anger and fear felt by whites in the North and
South. As Welsh observed, in the North these feelings were more suppressed, because of a
perceived  general  support  for  the  fight  against  racism.  Wallace  broke  this  political
correctness with language that was not outright racist, but definitely had a racialized
undertone.  He  was  saying  what  many  white  suburbanites  were  feeling:  resentment
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towards Washington for interfering in their lives. Wallace thus formed a bridge between
southern and northern whites angry with the federal government. “If white southerners
felt threatened by civil rights struggles prior to 1964, that threat mostly fostered fear,
discomfort, and anxiety,” historian Jason Sokol observed.26 Such emotions were not that
different from the feelings a significant number of whites in the North had. Instead of
beneficiaries from federal policy, these groups began to regard themselves as victims.
They also began to look at the South in a different light: no longer as a dark and gothic
bastion of  American apartheid,  but as a region victimized by a government eager to
please minorities. 
13 Federal support for minority rights made the “forgotten Americans” yearn for a society
that appeared to be vanishing: a community based on traditionalism and white control.
According to political scientist Paul Taggart, this idea of a lost “heartland” is central to
(the appeal of) populist politics. “It assumes or asserts that there was a good life before
the  corruptions  and distortions  of  the  present,”  Taggart  explains.  He  uses  the  term
“heartland” because “heartlands are something that is  felt rather than reasoned, and
something that is shrouded in imprecision.”27 Southern segregationists often described
their  region as  the actual  heartland of  Americanism,  a  locally  controlled polity with
respect for time-honored customs and under constant attack from outside forces, be it
the central government, civil rights radicals, or other “un-American” elements, including
communist  agents.  Such  an  idealistic  Jeffersonian  vision  of  the  South  was  not  very
credible as long as it was used to defend the worst excesses of Jim Crow. However, once
federal  legislation  dismantled  institutionalized  segregation,  this  vision  became  much
more palatable in other parts of the country, especially when civil rights activists began
to intensify their protests outside the South. Wallace’s remarkable performance in the
1964 primaries already signaled the latent presence of what Rogin described as “middle-
class authoritarianism” and the potential of a right-wing populist message based on a
heartland  with  typically  southern  values.28 “A  lot  of  the  people  attracted  to  George
Wallace are just people who think America has passed them by, leaving them confused,
screwed-up and unhappy,” journalist Pete Hamill remarked in 1968, “they want to go
back.”29 Governor  Wallace,  who  defiantly  stood  up  against  federal  power  in  1963,
promised a resurrection of the heartland these voters were longing for. 
 
2. Dog Whistles from the Deep South: Wallace and the
Advent of American Authoritarianism
14 The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 dealt a fatal blow to the
laws and many of the customs that upheld segregation, clearing the way for a “northern”
revamping  of  the  region.  The  South  finally  appeared  to  be  ready  to  move  into  the
American  mainstream.  But  what  defined  this  mainstream?  With  Jim  Crow  gone,  it
suddenly became clear the North was not without sin either – a fact foreshadowed by
Wallace’s success in the 1964 primaries. The North “was no longer, and perhaps never had
been, quite the picture of health it had always seemed,” famed southern historian James
Cobb  pointed  out.  The  angry  campaigns  against  racial  integration  that  happened  in
northern states during the late 1960s “made it all too apparent that white racism was
hardly  confined  to  white  southerners.”30 By  1968,  a  general  apprehension about  the
direction of the country took hold in Middle America. This process had been going on for
some time: according to historian James Patterson, the year 1965 served as the hinge for
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the sixties. The early 1960s had much more in common with the consensus climate of the
Eisenhower years, Patterson claimed. The tumultuous change we now associate with “the
Sixties” began in 1965, with the military escalation in Vietnam, the riots in Watts, the
fracturing (and radicalization) of the civil rights movement, and cultural transformations
that led to increased polarization in U.S. society. Three years later, these developments
had reached a  boiling  point.31 The  simultaneous  politicization of  evangelical  religion
increased  public  awareness  of  traditional  values  and  bolstered  opposition  to
progressivism.32 The  political  climate  was  thus  favorable  to  a  southern  populist  like
George Wallace:  the  country  seemed to  be spinning  out  of  control,  creating  anxiety
among a significant number of voters. 
15 In October 1968 Time magazine reported that 81 percent “of the public believe that law
enforcement  has  broken  down.  Even  more  believe  that  a  ‘strong’  President  can  do
something about it.”33 Since the Stand in the Schoolhouse Door, Wallace had been crafting
an image of himself as a tough leader who dared to stand up to federal intrusion, and as a
champion  of  police  power.  In  1968,  this  image  made  him popular  in  the  North.  At
campaign stops in Illinois and Missouri he told cheering crowds how an Alabama-style
police state might be the solution to the nation’s law and order problem. “If they [the
police] could run this country for about two years… they’d straighten it out,” he shouted.
34 Hostility  to  government  interference  and  enthusiasm  for  law  enforcement
totalitarianism  seems  contradictory,  but  for  Wallace  supporters  they  were  in  fact
complementary;  what  these  voters  wanted  was  an  end  to  the  lawlessness  and
permissiveness  they  associated  with  Lyndon  Johnson’s  Great  Society.  The  masculine
message  and  performance  of  George  Wallace  gave  Americans  estranged  from
establishment politics hope to reclaim control over their lives. Such sentiments (being in
control and resisting the domination of others) define manhood in the Western world and
especially  in  the  United  States.35 Right-wing  populists  like  Wallace  use  a  masculine
posture to present themselves as “strong male leaders who are vigorous in nature, plain-
spoken and authoritarian in character and style,” social scientist Susi Meret noted. These
politicians  offer  seemingly  simple  answers  “to  the  growing feelings  of  dispossession,
insecurity and distrust  that frequently emerge in times of  crisis.”36 In short,  anxious
voters distressed by rapid social change turn to strong masculine leaders who promise a
restoration of control and order.
16 The problem for Hubert Humphrey was his  complete identification with the Johnson
administration and its  policies  at  home and abroad.  He initially  seemed reluctant  to
challenge LBJ’s decisions, especially with regard to U.S. military conduct in Vietnam. “We
don’t need another Aaron Burr in this Republic,” Humphrey told reporters in July 1968,
referring to Thomas Jefferson’s troublesome vice president. “Of course I want to look to
the future – on everything… But that doesn’t mean I want to repudiate the past. I want to
start with what we got, in every area, and build on it.” Such statements provoked the ire
of antiwar protesters, who brought picket signs to Humphrey rallies saying: “Hubert Has
A Military-Industrial Complex.”37 Blue-collar and middle-class voters,  anguished about
social unrest and dissatisfied with Great Society programs geared towards minorities and
the poor, turned to Wallace or Republican candidate Richard Nixon, who campaigned on a
more  toned-down  program  of  states’  rights  and  law  and  order.  The  riots  that
accompanied the Democratic National Convention in Chicago only exacerbated the image
many Americans had of Humphrey and his party: wherever the Democrats went, chaos
erupted. A telephone poll indicated approval of the harsh police response against the
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demonstrators.  Only 21.3 percent of respondents agreed with the statement “Chicago
Police  and  National  Guardsmen  are  using  excessive  force  in  suppressing  these
demonstrations,” while almost 59 percent disagreed.38
17 Calls for small government and stronger law enforcement can be interpreted as coded
race words. GOP strategist Lee Atwater gave a striking description of these so-called dog
whistles in an interview that addressed the 1968 campaign. “You start out in 1954 by
saying ‘Nigger, nigger, nigger.’ By 1968 you can’t say ‘nigger’ – that hurts you. Backfires,”
Atwater explained. “So you say stuff like forced busing, states’ rights, and all that stuff.”39
Wallace supporters had little trouble decoding the dog whistles of their champion. “Y’all
know about law and order,” one of them said.  “It’s spelled n-i-g-g-e-r-s.”40 Yet racial
appeals  alone  do  not  explain  the  popularity  of  Wallace.  Republican  Congresswoman
Catherine May of Washington for instance wondered why so many people in her state –
according to her, a liberal state without profound racial problems – had Wallace stickers
on their cars. Racism undoubtedly formed the core of Wallace’s attraction; a millwright
and  Wallace  supporter  working  at  Ford’s  Rouge  factory  near  Detroit  unabashedly
declared: “I guess I’m what you might call a racist.”41 But also middle-class whites with a
decent income and education had warm feelings for the governor, because he promised a
return of traditional American values, which implied a restoration of white control. At
the same time, Wallace voters did not just oppose black militancy, but all sorts of protests
against the dominant culture. A blue-collar suburbanite from Los Angeles said: “punks,
the queers, the demonstrators and the hippies – we’re going to put them on a barge and
ship ’em off to China. Or better, sink it.” He believed Wallace would be elected president.42
Working-class parents who had saved money for years to put their children through
college felt a similar resentment towards affluent students who rebelled against a “rotten
system.” They considered student activists “spoiled brats, profane, obnoxious, unwashed,
promiscuous,  to  whom  everything  was  offered  and  from  whom nothing  has  been
demanded.”43 Not just government support for minorities, but also entitled youth and
establishment politicians aroused the ire of  Middle America and of Wallace voters in
particular.44
18 The American Independent Party (AIP) of George Wallace played on such outrage and
promised a solution to the “riots, minority group rebellions, domestic disorders, student
protests, spiraling living costs, soaring interest rates, a frightening increase in the crime
rate, war abroad and loss of personal liberty at home.” Although racial matters were
important for the AIP, it was not a single-issue party. Its platform gave hope to white
Americans who felt ignored by Republicans and Democrats. A vote for Wallace would
result  in  a  return of  the  United  States  to  “its  accustomed and deserved position of
leadership among the community of nations” and “relief from the continued turmoil,
frustration, and confusion” caused by “the fearful and inept leadership of our national
political parties.”45 Before formulating policy proposals, the AIP platform first described
the  feelings  (of  fear,  frustration,  and  confusion)  experienced  by  its  target  audience.
George Wallace articulated these feelings again in one of his final campaign speeches,
delivered on October 24, 1968, in a sold-out Madison Square Garden. He also pledged to
give the “average man on the street” control back over his life. “We are going to turn
back to you, the people of the states,  the right to control our domestic institutions,”
Wallace declared.46 George Wallace and the AIP thus offered strong leadership in dealing
with social problems and foreign entanglements that caused the negative emotional state
of Middle America.
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19 Besides the content  of  Wallace’s  message,  his  style and performance also stirred the
emotions of audiences at AIP rallies. Wallace biographer Dan Carter characterized it as “a
kind of soft-porn racism in which fear and hatred could be mobilized without mentioning
race itself.”47 The huge crowd at Madison Square Garden, swept up by roaring renditions
of “Dixie” and “I’m a Yankee Doodle Dandy,” responded passionately whenever their
leader  attacked the  federal  government,  intellectuals,  or  left-wing hecklers  who had
managed to enter the hall. In the meantime, Wallace bumped up and down the stage,
switching effortlessly between angry rhetoric and crude jokes meant to emasculate his
opponents. “That’s alright,” he told a longhaired protester. “That’s alright honey – that’s
right sweetie-pie – oh, that’s a he. I thought you were a she.”48 Gonzo journalist Hunter S.
Thompson  described  Wallace  rallies  like  the  one  in  Madison  Square  Garden  as  a
combination  between  a  religious  revival  and  a  political  “Janis  Joplin  Concert.”49
Supporters sometimes used biblical language to laud the Alabama governor. An admirer
from the industrial heartland of Pennsylvania even claimed, “Wallace is a new Messiah!”50
20 Wallace’s  showmanship contrasted sharply with the dour speeches of  Richard Nixon,
whose campaign staff called his appearances “drills.”51 Yet in the end, Nixon narrowly
beat Humphrey in the race for the presidency. During the final weeks of the campaign,
the Democratic candidate had made an impressive comeback. In a speech in Salt Lake City
at the end of September, he declared his independence from the Johnson administration
by saying he would consider a bombing halt of North Vietnam if it offered a reasonable
chance for peace. The labor unions eventually also began to campaign more actively for
Humphrey in order to stop the “Wallace infection.”52 Many blue-collar voters returned to
the Democratic Party in November, while suburbanites often chose for the lite version of
law and order presented by Richard Nixon.53 George Wallace had nonetheless waged a
formidable campaign, winning 13.5 percent of the national vote and 46 ballots in the
Electoral College. Moreover, with Nixon in the White House, at least parts of his Deep
South  program  reached  the  highest  levels  of  the  federal  government.  According  to
Hubert Humphrey, a “perfumed, deodorized” version of Wallace had won the presidential
election of 1968.54 Although Nixon initially belied Humphrey’s disparaging description (he
advocated a guaranteed minimum income for poor families and endorsed a bill lifting
federal compulsory minimum sentences for the sale and possession of drugs), a merciless
attitude towards welfare and crime eventually took hold during the 1970s and 1980s.
Gendered  and  racialized  notions  about  poverty  and  criminal  behavior  discredited
“maternalist  social  welfare  programs.”  Its  proponents  demanded  tough  policies  that
disproportionately  targeted  minorities  and  simultaneously  buttressed  the  power  of
dominant groups in U.S. society.55 In the long run, such masculinist and racialist visions
of law and order – visions that constituted the core of the Wallace campaign – were
implemented throughout the nation. 
 
Conclusion
21 In the spring of 2016, sociologist Arlie Russell Hochschild attended a Trump rally in New
Orleans, Louisiana. Two to three thousand people were waiting in the Lakefront Airport
hangar, carrying placards that said “TRUMP: MAKE AMERICA GREAT AGAIN” or “SILENT
MAJORITY STANDS WITH TRUMP!” Cheers broke out when the candidate climbed the
stage. The crowd kept cheering as Trump delivered the punch lines of his stump speech.
“Our country is going to hell,” he yelled. “But we’re going to make it great again!” The
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audience was primarily white. An older Trump admirer showed a sign with the words
“KKK  FOR  TRUMP.”  During  previous  rallies,  Trump  had  called  protesters  “bad,  bad
people… you hear that weak voice out there? That’s a protestor… They aren’t protestors. I
call them disruptors.” Sometimes he even asked for violent retribution against hecklers,
instructing his supporters to knock “the crap out of him, would you?” Such aggressive
and masculine rhetoric proved to be very effective. Trump beat Texas evangelical Ted
Cruz in the Louisiana primary and eventually won the election for president of the United
States.56
22 In  many  ways,  Donald  Trump’s  presidential  campaign  resembled  George  Wallace’s
attempt  to  become  president  in  1968.  Hochschild  described  Trump  as  an  “emotions
candidate,”  whose speeches evoked “dominance,  bravado,  clarity,  national  pride,  and
personal  uplift,”  thus inspiring “an emotional  transformation.” Angry and distraught
Americans who went to his rallies no longer felt  abandoned,  but thought they could
reclaim control over their lives. Negative sentiments had been transformed into positive
emotions; they were no longer strangers in their own land.57 Hochschild developed a so-
called “deep story” to uncover the feelings of her conservative respondents. This deep
story revolves around average white Americans (Christian, heterosexual, monogamous,
predominantly male) standing in line to climb a hill and reach the American Dream. But
then people of color, women, and refugees start cutting in line, often with the assistance
of  the federal  government;  Barack Obama is  helping them.  Hochschild’s  respondents
strongly identified with the white male Americans in the deep story.58 Their sense of
betrayal and abandonment by the political establishment led to desperation, nostalgia for
the past, and a vote for Donald Trump.
23 Similar feelings characterized the people who voted (or who contemplated voting) for
George Wallace. His appeal was based on “the ethos of the locker room,” a masculine code
that attracted young white males (between eighteen and thirty-five years old) to the AIP.
59 But white women opposed to busing were enamored with the Alabama governor as
well. After all, he voiced “the unease of the housewife who does not want to see her child
bussed  to  an  integrated  school.”60 The  National  Action  Group  (NAG),  an  anti-busing
organization founded by women in the Detroit  suburb of  Pontiac,  invited Wallace as
keynote speaker  and he also traveled to South Boston to proclaim his  opposition to
busing  there,  an  indication  of  his  nationwide  appeal  by  the  early  1970s.61 Although
Wallace  did  not  win  in  1968  and  his  presidential  aspirations  were  cut  short  by  an
assassin’s  bullet  in  1972,  the  Republican  Party  continued  to  nurture  his  style  and
program, while the Democrats slowly turned away from its blue-collar and lower middle-
class base. The consequence of these decisions on the right and left was the development
of a very volatile political climate in which a significant number of white voters began to
feel estranged and under threat – a climate comparable to the mid- and late 1960s. Back
then, labor unions were still strong enough to convince their members to vote for the
Democratic candidate. But in 2016, the old industrial heartland of the United States (and a
former Democratic stronghold) backed Donald Trump, who also had substantial support
in the suburbs.62 
24 Trump’s victory was the result of long-term structural developments in U.S. society and
its economy. The demise of the heavy industry sector and the concomitant outsourcing of
blue-collar jobs that started in the 1970s left many working-class Americans without any
perspective. The global flow of work and people brought other challenges too; the influx
of migrants from across the world (but especially from Latin America) made the United
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States a more diverse country, but it also caused anxiety among Americans who identified
with the Silent Majority. With jobs going out and immigrants coming in, they felt that
their idea of America was disappearing – that they were losing control. The Republican
Party, taking stock of Wallace’s successful politics of rage, continued to encourage such
feelings, while the Democrats embarked on a more neoliberal course after the disastrous
1972 campaign of George McGovern. These political responses to social change generated
potential for a populist reaction, either from the left or the right. For decades, Democrats
managed to hold on to their “blue wall” states in the Rust Belt – Bill Clinton on the basis
of a progressive economic platform (that was quickly toned down once he had won the
White House) and Barack Obama with a grassroots coalition after the financial crisis of
2007-2008.63 But the socially progressive character of the Obama administration and the
fact  that  he  was  the  first  black  president  also  created resentment,  evidenced by an
explosive growth of  right-wing militia groups since his  election.64 These latent white
supremacist sentiments – articulated by George Wallace, cultivated by the Republicans,
and ignored or disparaged by the Democrats – finally burst into the open in 2016, when
the  establishment  of  both  parties  was  caught  unawares  by  a  phenomenon they  had
created:  a  déjà  vu  of  the  1968  campaign,  but  this  time,  the  demagogue  won.  The
presidential  elections  of  1968  and  2016  indicate  how  right-wing  populism  based  on
authoritarianism  and  toxic  masculinity  can  effectively  arouse  lurking  feelings  of
alienation, anger, anxiety, and fear. As such, they demonstrate the remarkable power of
gender and emotions in political campaigns.
25 Proper names: 
Lee Atwater, Aaron Burr, Bill Clinton, Ted Cruz, Dwight Eisenhower, Newt Gingrich, Barry
Goldwater,  Pete Hamill,  James Hood,  Hubert  Humphrey,  Thomas Jefferson,  Lyndon B.
Johnson, Nicholas Katzenbach, John F. Kennedy, Vivian Malone, Catherine May, George
McGovern,  Richard  Nixon,  Barack  Obama,  Ronald  Reagan,  Michael  Rogin,  Hunter  S.
Thompson, Donald Trump, George Wallace, Matthew Welsh.
NOTES
1. “From Mexican Rapists to Bad Hombres, the Trump Campaign in Two Moments,” Washington
Post, October 20, 2016, accessed September 6, 2018, https://wapo.st/2MPcwna; “Trump Calls to
‘Drain the Swamp’ of Washington,” USA Today,  October 18, 2016, accessed September 6,  2018,
https://usat.ly/2CAjrw7. George Corley Wallace (1919-1998) was governor of Alabama from 1963
till 1967, from 1971 till 1979, and from 1983 till 1987. Wallace was a populist who toned down his
segregationist message in the 1970s. He participated in the Democratic presidential primaries of
1964, 1972, and 1976. In 1968, Wallace ran as a third-party candidate for the presidency. He was
shot in 1972 at  a rally in Maryland,  paralyzing him from the waist  down and ending a very
successful primary campaign. 
2. See Dan T. Carter, From George Wallace to Newt Gingrich: Race in the Conservative Counterrevolution,
1963-1994 (Baton Rouge:  Louisiana State University Press,  1995) and The Politics  of  Rage:  George
Wallace,  The  Origins  of  the  New Conservatism,  and the  Transformation of  American Politics (2 nd ed.,
Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2000).
The Whistles of George Wallace: Gender and Emotions in the 1968 Presidential ...
European journal of American studies, 14-1 | 2019
11
3. Matthew  D.  Lassiter,  The  Silent  Majority:  Suburban  Politics  in  the  Sunbelt  South (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2007), especially chapter 10. For a short description of this newer
scholarship, see Patricia Cohen, “Interpreting Some Overlooked Stories From the South,” New
York Times, May 1, 2007. For a critical discussion of their work, see Glenn Feldman, review of The
Myth of Southern Exceptionalism, ed. Matthew D. Lassiter and Joseph Crespino, Journal of Southern
History 77, no. 3 (August 2011): 783-786.
4. Byron E. Shafer and Richard Johnston, The End of Southern Exceptionalism: Class, Race, and Partisan
Change in the Postwar South (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), 2. 
5. Earl Black and Merle Black, The Rise of Southern Republicans (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 2002), 251, 373. On page 373 they write: “Low-income religious whites, for instance, were
almost  as  pro-Republican  as  high-income  secular  white  men.”  Both  Carter  and  Shafer  and
Johnston  also  began  to  underscore  the  importance  of  religion  in  understanding  southern
political culture. See their contributions in Angie Maxwell and Todd G. Shields, Unlocking V.O. Key
Jr.: Southern Politics for the Twenty-First Century (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 2011).
6. See for instance Lisa McGirr, Suburban Warriors: The Origins of the New American Right (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2001) and Lassiter, The Silent Majority, 24-25.
7. Kari Frederickson, “‘As a Man, I Am Interested in States’ Rights’: Gender, Race, and the Family
in the Dixiecrat Party, 1948-1950,” in Jumpin’ Jim Crow: Southern Politics from Civil War to Civil Rights,
ed. Jane Dailey, Glenda Elizabeth Gilmore, and Bryant Simon (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2000), 261. 
8. Steve Estes, “A Question of Honor: Masculinity and Massive Resistance to Integration,” in White
Masculinity in the Recent South,  ed. Trent Watts (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
2008), 69, EBSCO Academic Collection.
9. Frederickson, “‘As a Man, I Am Interested in States’ Rights,’” 261. A more recent study that
“positions Jim Crow as a system of cultural exchange and power” is Stephen A. Berry, The Jim
Crow Routine: Everyday Performances of Race, Civil Rights, and Segregation in Mississippi (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 2015), 4. Gender also remains an understudied category in the
research on populism. See Niels Spierings et. al., “Gender and Populist Radical-Right Politics: An
Introduction,” Patterns of Prejudice 49, nos. 1-2 (2015): 4, 5-6. 
10. A  central  element  of  intersectionality  theory  “is  the  idea  that  all  of  us  have  multiple
identities – race, gender, class, sexual orientation, and so on – and these multiple social identities
intersect in ways that shape the form and extent of discrimination we experience.” See Devon W.
Carbado and Mitu Gulati, Acting White? Rethinking Race in “Post-Racial” America (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2013), 69. 
11. Devon W. Carbado, “Colorblind Intersectionality,” Signs 38, no. 4 (2013): 841. On the same
page Carbado concluded: “The point of departure for this essay was the idea that many scholars
frame intersectionality  more narrowly than is  theoretically  necessary… My hope is  that  this
engagement will end some of the abstract debates about what intersectionality can and cannot
do and encourage more scholars to push the theoretical boundaries of intersectionality rather
than disciplining and policing them.” 
12. Richard Nixon popularized the term “Silent Majority” on November 3, 1969, in a speech on
the Vietnam War.
13. Rick  Perlstein,  Nixonland:  The  Rise  of  a  President  and  the  Fracturing  of  America  (New  York:
Scribner, 2008), xii.
14. A recent example of this “emotional turn” scholarship in political history is Frank Costigliola,
“‘I  React  Intensely  to  Everything’:  Russia  and the  Frustrated  Emotions  of  George  F.  Kennan,
1933-1958,” Journal of American History 102, no. 4 (March 2016): 1075-1106. See also Barbara Keys,
“Henry  Kissinger:  The  Emotional  Statesman,”  Diplomatic  History  35,  no.  4  (September  2011):
587-609. 
The Whistles of George Wallace: Gender and Emotions in the 1968 Presidential ...
European journal of American studies, 14-1 | 2019
12
15. Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Populism: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford
University Press,  2017),  5-6;  Benjamin Moffitt,  The Global  Rise  of  Populism:  Performance,  Political
Style,  and  Representation  (Stanford:  Stanford  University  Press,  2016),  25-37.  EBSCO  Academic
Collection. 
16. Pankaj Mishra, Age of Anger: A History of the Present (London: Allen Lane, 2017), 8, 75-76. Toxic
masculinity can be described as “the harmful impact of masculinities that emphasize dominance,
the use of violence to solve problems, and the suppression of emphatic emotions, like sadness,
fear and compassion.” Kyle C. Ashlee et. al., “Fostering Critical Awareness of Masculinity around
the World,” in Global Agenda for Social Justice, ed. Glenn W. Muschert et. al. (Bristol: Policy Press,
2018), 1: 73.
17. E. Culpepper Clark, The Schoolhouse Door: Segregation’s Last Stand at the University of Alabama
(New York and Oxford:  Oxford University Press,  1993),  256;  “Statement and Proclamation by
Governor  George  C.  Wallace,  University  of  Alabama,  June  11,  1963,”  Alabama Department  of
Archives  and  History,  accessed  August  18,  2018,  http://www.archives.state.al.us/govs_list/
schooldoor.html. 
18. Carter, From George Wallace to Newt Gingrich, 6. Emphasis mine.
19. Matthew E. Welsh, “Civil Rights and the Primary Election of 1964 in Indiana: The Wallace
Challenge,” Indiana Magazine of History 75, no. 1 (March 1979): 27. President Johnson was already
sure of the nomination and did not participate in the Indiana primary.
20. Ibid., 17, 27. For the use of humor in politics, see for example Chris Smith and Ben Voth, “The
Role  of  Humor  in  Political  Argument:  How  ‘Strategery’  and  ‘Lockboxes’  Changed  a  Political
Campaign,” Argumentation and Advocacy 39, no. 2 (2002): 110-129, and David M. Rhea, “There They
Go Again: The Use of Humor in Presidential Debates, 1960-2008,” Argumentation and Advocacy 49,
no. 2 (2012): 115-131.
21. Welsh, “Civil Rights and the Primary Election of 1964 in Indiana,” 26.
22. Ibid., 2.
23. Ibid., 8-9.
24. Michael  Rogin,  “Wallace  and the Middle  Class:  The White  Backlash in  Wisconsin,”  Public
Opinion Quarterly 30, no. 1 (1966): 106.
25. Lassiter, The Silent Majority, 3-5; Michael Stewart Foley, Front Porch Politics: The Forgotten Heyday
of American Activism in the 1970s and 1980s (New York: Hill and Wang, 2013), 43-44; Jason Sokol,
There Goes My Everything: White Southerners in the Age of Civil Rights, 1945-1975 (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf,  2006),  224-227;  Jeanne  Theoharis,  “Hidden in  Plain  Sight:  The  Civil  Rights  Movement
outside the South,” in The Myth of Southern Exceptionalism,  ed. Matthew D. Lassiter and Joseph
Crespino (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 52. 
26. Sokol, There Goes My Everything, 225.
27. Paul  Taggart,  “Populism and Representative  Politics  in  Contemporary  Europe,”  Journal  of
Political Ideologies 9, no. 3 (2004): 274. Emphasis mine.
28. Rogin, “Wallace and the Middle Class,” 100.
29. Jefferson Cowie, Stayin’ Alive: The 1970s and the Last Days of the Working Class (London and New
York: New Press, 2010), 131-132.
30. James C. Cobb, Away Down South: A History of Southern Identity (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2005), 217. See also Theoharis, “Hidden in Plain Sight,” 51.
31. James T.  Patterson,  The Eve  of  Destruction:  How 1965  Transformed America  (New York:  Basic
Books, 2012), xiii-xv.
32. For  a  comprehensive  study  on  the  advent  of  (Sunbelt)  evangelical  politics,  see  Darren
Dochuk, From Bible Belt to Sunbelt: Plain-Folk Religion, Grassroots Politics, and the Rise of Evangelical
Conservatism (New York and London: W.W. Norton, 2011), especially part IV.
33. “The Fear Campaign,” Time, October 4, 1968.
34. “Neither Tweedledum, Nor Tweedledee,” Time, September 20, 1968.
The Whistles of George Wallace: Gender and Emotions in the 1968 Presidential ...
European journal of American studies, 14-1 | 2019
13
35. Douglas  Schrock  and  Michael  Schwalbe,  “Men,  Masculinity,  and  Manhood  Acts,”  Annual
Review of Sociology 35 (August 2009): 280.
36. Susi  Meret,  “Charismatic  Female  Leadership  and Gender:  Pia  Kjærsgaard and the  Danish
People’s Party,” Patterns of Prejudice 49, nos. 1-2 (2015): 83. 
37. “In Search of Political Miracles,” Time, July 26, 1968. The same article described Humphrey as
“a liberal in the New Deal-Fair Deal-Great Society sense of the term. Solution-by-government
does not alarm him, and neither does the rustle of federal billions leaving the Treasury.”
38. Charles  Kaiser,  1968  in  America:  Music,  Politics,  Chaos,  Counterculture,  and  the  Shaping  of  a
Generation (New York: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1988), 246.
39. Alexander P. Lamis, “The Two-Party South: From the 1960s to the 1990s,” in Southern Politics
in  the  1990s,  ed.  Alexander  P.  Lamis  (Baton Rouge:  Louisiana State  University  Press,  1999),  8.
According to legal scholar Ian Haney López, dog whistle politics “simply means speaking in code
to a  target  audience.”  Although he examines  “coded talk  centered on race… the term could
encompass clandestine solicitations on any number of bases.” See Ian Haney López, Dog Whistle
Politics:  How Coded Racial Appeals Reinvented Racism and Wrecked the Middle Class (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2014), 4.
40. “Nixon’s Hard-Won Chance to Lead,” Time, November 15, 1968.
41. “The Wallace Factor,” Time, September 27, 1968. “Even in such relatively tranquil and liberal
states as Connecticut, Kansas, and Washington, support [for Wallace] is abundantly in evidence,”
the reporter discovered.
42. “The Fear Campaign,” Time, October 4, 1968.
43. Ibid.
44. Marshall  Frady,  “The  American Independent  Party,”  in  History  of  U.S.  Political  Parties,  ed.
Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. (New York and London: Chelsea House Publishers, 1973), 4: 3430-3431. 
45. “American Independent Platform of 1968,” in History of U.S. Political Parties, 4: 3447.
46. George C. Wallace, “Speech at Madison Square Garden, October 24, 1968,” in History of U.S.
Political Parties, 4: 3492-3493.
47. Carter, From George Wallace to Newt Gingrich, 4.
48. Wallace, “Speech at Madison Square Garden,” 3496; “Alabamian Given Lengthy Ovation,” New
York Times, October 25, 1968.
49. Carter, From George Wallace to Newt Gingrich, 18.
50. “Support from the Guts,” Time, March 1, 1968.
51. “In Search of Political Miracles,” Time, July 26, 1968.
52. Carter, The Politics of Rage, 351-352; Carl Solberg, Hubert Humphrey: A Biography (New York and
London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1984), 388-389.
53. J.  Michael  Ross,  Reeve D.  Vanneman,  and Thomas F.  Pettigrew,  “Patterns  of  Support  for
George Wallace: Implications for Racial Change,” Journal of Social Studies 36, no. 2 (1976): 85-86.
The authors concluded on these pages that “Republicans liked him [Wallace] far better than was
thought to be the case… Many voters  who liked Wallace were even more positively inclined
toward  Nixon  and  voted  for  the  Republican  candidate.”  See  also  Joseph  Lowndes,  “From
Founding Violence to Political  Hegemony:  The Conservative  Populism of  George Wallace,”  in
Populism and the Mirror of Democracy, ed. Francisco Panizza (London and New York: Verso, 2005),
163.
54. David Farber, The Age of Great Dreams: America in the 1960s (New York: Hill and Wang, 1994),
226.
55. Julilly Kohler-Hausmann, Getting Tough: Welfare and Imprisonment in 1970s America (Princeton
and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2017), 4-5; Ross, Vanneman, and Pettigrew, “Patterns of
Support for George Wallace,” 89-90.
56. Arlie Russell Hochschild, Strangers in Their Own Land: Anger and Mourning on the American Right
(New York and London: Free Press, 2016), 222-224.
The Whistles of George Wallace: Gender and Emotions in the 1968 Presidential ...
European journal of American studies, 14-1 | 2019
14
57. Ibid., 225. Hochschild does not mention Wallace in her book.
58. Ibid., 135-145.
59. Dan T. Carter, “Legacy of Rage: George Wallace and the Transformation of American Politics,”
Journal of Southern History 62, no. 1 (February 1996): 10-11. Trump dismissed his lewd comments
about women as “locker room talk.” See Louis Nelson, “From ‘Locker Room Talk’  On, Trump
Fends Off Misconduct Claims,” Politico,  December 12, 2017, accessed January 17, 2019, https://
politi.co/2VFAgLy.
60. “Wallace’s Army: The Coalition of Frustration,” Time, October 18, 1968.
61. Elizabeth Gillespie McRae, Mothers of Massive Resistance: White Women and the Politics of White
Supremacy  (New  York:  Oxford  University Press,  2018),  222,  227,  https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/
oso/9780190271718.003.0010. 
62. Christine  J.  Walley,  “Trump’s  Election and the ‘White  Working Class’:  What  We Missed,”
American Ethnologist 44, no. 2 (2017): 234-235.
63. Joshua Mound, “What Democrats Still Don’t Get About George McGovern,” The New Republic,
February 29, 2016, accessed January 17, 2019, https://bit.ly/1QGTSEw. See also Oscar Winberg,
“Insult Politics: Donald Trump, Right-Wing Populism, and Incendiary Language,” European Journal
of American Studies 12, no. 2 (Summer 2017): 4-5, par. 11-13, https://doi.org/10.4000/ejas.12132.
64. “Antigovernment Movement,” SPLC, accessed January 17, 2019, https://bit.ly/2Hhs1SK.
ABSTRACTS
Gender and emotions are important factors in the rise of modern U.S. conservatism. This article
examines the 1968 presidential  election as a pivotal moment in the development of the New
Right. During that campaign, George Wallace practiced a masculine political style that evoked an
emotional response from anxious voters who felt alienated and angry. Wallace set the stage for a
conservative political strategy that remains effective until this day.
INDEX
Keywords: emotions, gender, masculinity, populism, U.S. South, conservatism
AUTHOR
MAARTEN ZWIERS
Maarten Zwiers is Assistant Professor of American Studies and Contemporary History at the
University of Groningen, the Netherlands. His main area of expertise is the history and culture of
the US South. He is the author of Senator James Eastland: Mississippi’s Jim Crow Democrat (Louisiana
State University Press, 2015), has published in Southern Cultures and the Southern Quarterly, and
contributed to The New Encyclopedia of Southern Culture and The Mississippi Encyclopedia. His
research primarily focuses on rural history and regional identity, often from an interdisciplinary
and comparative perspective. Zwiers wrote about the rise of right-wing populism in the United
States and Europe and compared rural rock music in a study of Lynyrd Skynyrd and Normaal, a
The Whistles of George Wallace: Gender and Emotions in the 1968 Presidential ...
European journal of American studies, 14-1 | 2019
15
band from the Dutch countryside. Besides his work on segregationist politics, he is currently
developing a new project about the rise of agrarian leftwing radicalism in the United States and
the Dutch Northeast.
The Whistles of George Wallace: Gender and Emotions in the 1968 Presidential ...
European journal of American studies, 14-1 | 2019
16
